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实验经济学系列讲座(八) Common Value Auctions with Return Policies: An Experiment

发表于:2014年10月31日 分类:未分类

 

报告题目:Common Value Auctions with Return Policies: An Experiment

报 告 人:杜宁华

报告时间:116日(周四) 15:00-17:00

报告地点:博学楼422, 实验经济学实验室

主办单位:科研处  实验经济学实验室

【主讲人简介】

     杜宁华  上海财经大学实验经济学实验室主任,副教授、博士生导师。2005年获得美国亚利桑那大学经济学博士学位,主攻实验经济学。亚利桑那大学经济科学实验室由2002年诺贝尔经济学奖得主Vernon Smith创建。

杜宁华博士近年来致力于运用实验手段回答各种与市场机制相关的问题,其研究成果见于Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationDecision Support Systems等著名国际学术期刊,以及《管理科学学报》等国内权威期刊。

报告内容摘要:

In common-value second-price auctions of items with uncertain value, we examine the role of fixed-fee return policies that resemble many situations in real business practice: e.g., deposits in oil field auctions, mineral and gas right auctions, spectrum auctions, and money-back guarantees with fixed shipping and handling charges in eBay auctions. Theory makes the prediction that a more generous return policy will hurt the winning bidder by eroding consumer surplus through higher bids. Theory also demonstrates that the seller’s revenue increases as the handling fee for returning the auctioned item decreases, but remains positive. For free returns, there are multiple equilibria, all involving zero consumer surplus for the winning bidder, but with different implications for sellers. In our experimental setting, items may have a high value of 100 or a low value of 0 with an a priori 50% probability of each outcome. There are experimental four treatments: No Return (NR), High Fee (HF), Low Fee (LF) and Free Return (FR). We observe that bids increase and bidders’ earnings decrease when the handling fee decreases as predicted. However, we also observe that in the FR treatment many bidders bid above the highest possible value and subsequently return the item regardless of the revealed value. While this is consistent with equilibrium behavior, it is an equilibrium that is not optimal for the seller.

固定链接: http://elab.dufe.edu.cn/archives/361 | 实验经济学实验室